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Court Recognizes Domestic 
Violence Survivor's Fair Housing 
Challenge to Eviction 
by Danielle Pelfrey Duryea* 
Hailed by the ACLU Women's Rights Project as "the 
first case ever to hold that the Fair Housing Act prohibits 
discrimination against domestic violence victims," Bouley 
v. Young-Sabourin1 represents a significant advance for the 
housing rights of domestic violence survivors.2 In a March 
2005 decision denying cross-motions for summary judg­
ment, the United States District Court for the District of 
Vermont recognized domestic violence survivor Quinn 
Bouley's claim of disparate treatment as a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. Bouley 
settled favorably with her landlord in April before the 
case could go to trial. 
Background: 
Domestic Violence, Women and Housing 
United States Department of Justice statistics indicate 
that intimate partners inflicted 20% of all non-fatal vio­
lence against women in 2001 and about one-third of all 
homicides of women in 2000.3 Because about 85% of all 
intimate partner violence in the United States is commit­
ted against women, the far-reaching effects of domestic 
violence have a dramatically disproportionate effect on 
women.4 Although non-fatal intimate partner violence 
against women is down by about one-half since 1993,5 
domestic violence remains a major reason for homeless­
ness across the United States.6 More than a third of U.S. 
cities report domestic violence as a primary cause of 
'Danielle Pelfrey Duryea was a law clerk at NHLP in the summer of 
2005. She is a J.D./ M.P.P. candidate at Georgetown Uruversity and holds 
degrees from Yale Uruversity and the Uruversity of VirgirUa. 
'No. Gv.1:03 CV 320, 2005 WL 950632 (D. Vt. Mar. 10, 2005). 
:Press Release, American Civil Liberties Uruon, Federal Law Protects 
Battered �omen From Housing Discrimination, Court Rules (April 1, 
2005), avarlable at http:/ I www.aclu.org/ WomensRights/ WomensRights. 
cfm?ID=l7883&e=173. The decision and ACLU amicus brief are available 
at the same location. 
ULLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF }US'fiCE STATISTICS, INnMATE PARTNER 
VIOLEt-.CE 19 93-20011 (2003), available at http:/ I www.ojp.usdoj.gov /bjs/ 
pub/pdf/ipvOl.pdf. The comparable figures for men victirrUzed by inti­
mate partners were 3% for nonfatal violence and 4% for murders. /d. 
'See rd. These statistics are for 2001. 
'Id. 
'Emily ). Martin and Naonti S. Stem, Domestic Violence and Public and 
Subsidized Housing: Addressing tl!e Needs of Battered Tenants T l!rougl! Local 
Housing Policy, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 551, 552 (2005). 
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homelessness? Depending on their region of residence, 
between 22% and 57% of homeless women report that 
domestic violence was the precipitating cause of their 
homelessness.8 Whether they face losing shelter when 
they flee intrafamily violence or when they are evicted as 
a direct result of the violence, women living in poverty are 
at special risk. 
Domestic violence survivors face a variety of forms 
of housing discrimination in admissions and occupancy, 
as well as in evictions.9 Women who have been complain­
ing victims in a criminal proceeding may find themselves 
"screened out" of housing opportunities when their names 
appear in background checks. Mandatory arrest policies 
and courts that issue mutual protection orders may even 
result in criminal record checks that make victims appear 
to be perpetrators. A survivor often may not have a solid 
work or credit history or landlord references because the 
abuser has prevented her from holding a steady job, main­
taining financial independence, or developing interper­
sonal relationships with others. 
As a condition of tenancy, landlords sometimes 
demand that no violence occur in the future, a condition 
not imposed on other residents. Where a victim is living 
with her abuser but only the abuser's name is listed on 
the lease, authorities may assert that they cannot evict the 
perpetrator and allow the victim to continue her occu­
pancy. A victim may be held financially accountable for 
her abuser's damage to a rental property. And anecdotal 
evidence from advocates in the field suggests that sex 
stereotype-based animus underlies much discrimination 
against domestic violence victims in admissions, occu­
pancy and evictions. 
Landlord Tried to Evict Within Seventy-Two 
Hours ofViolent Domestic Incident 
Jacqueline Yaung-Sabourin owns one three-unit pri­
vate rental property in St. Albans, Vermont, that includes 
two rental apartments and a bungalow inhabited by her 
daughter-in-law and apartment manager, Windee Young. 
Three months after Quinn Bouley and her family rented 
one of the apartments, Bouley's husband attacked her at 
their home. Daniel Sweda was arrested the night of the inci­
dent and eventually pled guilty to several criminal charges 
related to the attack, including assault. Bouley applied for 
a restraining order against her husband on the night of the 
attack, and he never returned to the apartment. 
7ld. (citing 2003 survey). 
8/d. (citing eleven national and regional studies). 
"Telephone Interview with Naonti Stern, Staff Attorney, National Law 
Center on Homelessness and Poverty Oune 22, 2005); Lenora M. Lapi­
dus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 3 77,384-85 (2003); Telephone 
Interview with Entily Martin, Staff Attorney, ACLU Women's Rights 
Project Oune 20, 2005). 
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Apartment manager Young, on whose judgment 
Young-Sabourin relied, however, had already decided 
that Bouley "didn't fit the role of a victim of domestic vio­
lence." Not only had she not been in shock and was still 
able to function following the incident, observed Young, 
but she had also expressed anger toward her husband and 
showed no interest in reconciling with him. On deposi­
tion, Young explained further that she was also dubious of 
Bouley's abuse claim because she had seen Bouley with a 
male visitor not long after the attack, and because Bouley 
had received attention from men in her workplace that the 
apartment manager found inappropriate. 
The day after the attack, landlord Young-Sabourin 
made a list of reasons to evict Bouley that included the 
domestic violence incident. She then went to visit Bouley, 
engaging her in a conversation about the incident and 
about Bouley' religious faith. The conversation apparently 
ended with Bouley angrily refusing to discuss religion 
with her landlord. Later that day, le s than seventy-two 
hours after Bouley's husband criminally attacked her, the 
landlord sent a letter giving Bouley thirty days' notice to 
leave the apartment. The letter quoted a lease provision 
that read: 
Tenant will not use or allow said premises or any 
part thereof to be used for unlawful purposes, in 
any noisy, boisterous, or any other manner offen­
sive to any other occupant of the building. 
Yaung-Sabourin's letter further cited Bouley's angry 
response to her religious inquiries as proof that "the vio­
lence that has been happening in your unit would con­
tinue." 
Survivor Points to Gender Stereotypes 
Represented by Vermont Legal Aid, Bouley argued to 
the federal court that Young-Sabourin initiated eviction 
proceedings against her on the basis of her sex and her 
religion in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Initially, Bou­
ley brought her sex discrimination claim under a disparate 
impact theory. Because women represent the great major­
ity of domestic violence victims, the complaint alleged 
that discriminating against domestic violence victims on 
the basis of their victim status disproportionately affects 
women in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Cases such 
as Alvera v. The C.B.M. Group did much to establish a dis­
parate impact theory for domestic violence victims threat­
ened with eviction as a result of their abuser's actions.10 
Alvera, a plaintiff whose situation was similar to Bouley's, 
argued that the defendant management company's "zero­
tolerance" policy against household violence--which 
had the effect of displacing both the perpetrator and the 
10Alvera v. 11te C.B.M. Group, Inc., Gvil No. 01-857-PA (D. Or. October 
2001); see Domestic Abuse Victim Settles Discriminatory Eviction Claim 
Favorably, 31 Hous. L. BuLL. 265, 265 (2001). 
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victim of domestic violence--amounted to prohibited 
sex discrimination because the victims of domestic vio­
lence are disproportionately women. This approach has 
been sanctioned, too, by the Department of Housing a nd 
Urban Development's Fair Housing and Equal Oppor­
tunity office, which issued a charge of discrimination 
against Alvera's landlord on this basis. The Alvera case 
subsequently settled without judicial resolution of the 
Fair Housing Act claim's validity. 
As discovery in Boulelj v. Young-Sabourin proceeded, 
however, Vermont Legal Aid attorney Meris Bergquist, 
working with the ACLU Women's Rights Project, real­
ized that there was more than disparate impact involved 
in the case. The landlord and apartment manager's depo­
sitions clearly revealed that they believed that Bouley 
did not behave "normal[ly] for a woman who had been 
victimized" and that she and her husband were equally 
responsible for the incident that led to his arrest and sub­
sequent guilty plea. So Bouley's cross-motion for sum­
mary judgment, supported by the ACLU's amicus curiae 
brief, advanced a novel approach to domestic violence 
survivors' sex discrimination claims under the Fair Hous­
ing Act: disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. 
Under the disparate treatment theory, modeled on 
and analogous to the well-developed case law on employ­
ment discrimination under Title Vll, housing discrimina­
tion against a woman because she fails to conform to sex 
or gender stereotypes violates the Fair Housing Act. Just 
as an employee cannot be denied a promotion because 
she is "too aggressive for a woman," then, a tenant can­
not be evicted because she fails to conform to a stereotype 
of appropriate feminine behavior for a victim of domestic 
violence.11 According to an expert in the field of female 
abuse and victimization who submitted a declaration on 
behalf of Bouley, Young-Sabourin acted on three gender 
stereotypes: 
1. that domestic violence can be provoked and that some­
times, as in this case, both parties are responsible; 
2. that victims do not get angry and therefore that Bou­
ley's anger both at her husband and at Yaung-Sab­
ourin was proof that she had violent potential; and 
3. that men who appear "upright" and "honorable," as 
Young-Sabourin perceived Daniel Swedo to be, do not 
beat their wives.U 
Because Bouley's behavior after the violent incident 
was not consistent with the landlord and apartment man­
ager's gender-stereotyped expectations of how a domestic 
violence victim "should" behave, and because they held 
a positive view of her husband, Bouley's motion argued, 
they sought to evict her. 
"See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
12See Pt.'s Cross Mot. for Summary Judgment at 10 (citing Decl. of Sharon 
Lamb, Ed.D.). 
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Court Denies Summary judgment and 
Allows Fair Housing Claim to Proceed 
Denying Bouley and Yaung-Sabourin's cross-motions 
for summary judgment, Judge J. Garvan Murtha stated 
without qualification that "[t]he plaintiff has demon­
strated a prima facie case" of sex discrimination under 
the Fair Housing Act.13 Under the McDonnell Douglas14 
burden-shifting framework, the timing of the eviction, 
combined with reasonable inferences a jury could draw 
from the eviction notice, were held to return responsibility 
to the landlord to assert a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the decision to evict Bouley. Having asserted 
no such reason, Young-Sabourin was not entitled to sum­
mary judgment. 
The Court's brief discussion did not explicitly address 
the disparate treatment and disparate impact arguments. 
Although the Second Circuit has played a significant role 
in developing the disparate treatment law under Title V II, 
and even though that circuit has "pointedly accepted" the 
analogical relationship between Title VII  and Fair Hous­
ing Act interpretation,15 the Court declined to elaborate on 
its reasoning, naming as authority for its determination a 
single case in which both disparate impact and disparate 
treatment were cited in opposition to a police policy treat­
ing domestic and non-domestic disputes differently.16 The 
ACLU amicus brief had discussed this case at some length, 
however, as judicial recognition that "treatment of domes­
tic violence victims in a 'stereotypic and predefined place' 
within the family constitute[s] sex discrimination."17  
More significantly, the fact that the Court applied the 
McDonnell Douglas test implies that it had disparate treat­
ment, rather than disparate impact, in mind, as the McDon­
nell Douglas applies only to disparate treatment claims. 
The Court also denied, though it did not discuss, Bou­
ley's cross-motion for summary judgment.18 
13Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, No. Civ.1:03 CV 320, 2005 WL 950632 at *5 
(D. Vt. Mar. 10, 2005). 
14McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 7952 (1973). 
15ACLU Women's Rights Project, Mem.of Law as Amicus Curiae in Supp. 
of Pl.'s Mot. for and Opp'n to Summary Judgment at 11 (quoting Hun­
tington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 1096 (2d. Cir. 
1988), aff'd 488 U.S. 15 (1988)); see also Pl.'s Cross Mot. for Summary Judg­
ment at 7. 
'"Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203, 1212-13 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
17ACLU, Mem.of Law as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for and 
Opp'n to Summary Judgment at 4 (quoting Elyria, 857 F. Supp. at 1212). 
18Presurnably the Court did not accept her argument that, under the Price 
Waterhouse analysis of "mixed motives"-i.e., where there may have 
been both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the adverse action-the 
McDontJell Douglas prima facie case concept did not apply. Price Water­
house u. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (finding firm liable where both legitimate 
and sex-discriminatory factors motivated its denial of partnership to 
a woman). Under this analysis, Bouley argued, she would have been 
entitled to summary judgment if the Court accepted: (1) that Bouley 
had established that gender was a motivating factor in the attempt to 
evict her; and (2) that Young-Sabourin would be unable to prove by a 
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Advocates' Best Lessons 
The housing issues faced by domestic violence survi­
vors have sometimes "fallen between the stools," accord­
ing to both Emily Martin of the ACLU and Naomi Stern of 
the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty.19 
Housing advocates have not always recognized the spe­
cial plight of women threatened with homelessness as 
a result of intrafamily violence, and the women's rights 
community has sometimes misunderstood the nature of 
housing legal issues. And there has been little commu­
nication or cooperation between housing and domestic 
violence advocates. As a result, the law is underdevel­
oped. As Martin emphasizes, however, this is a "winnable 
fight": once educated about the problem, most law- and 
policymakers are sympathetic. 
There has been little communication or 
cooperation between housing and domestic 
violence advocates. As a result, 
the law is underdeveloped. 
Although both Stern and Martin lament the lack of 
detailed discussion in the Court's decision, both are opti­
mistic about the future of the disparate treatment theory 
of sex discrimination against intrafarnily violence survi­
vors. "This [decision] is the clearest law we have yet," 
says Martin, while Stern characterizes sex discrimination 
under the Fair Housing Act as a "very powerful" theory 
that should be vigorously pursued to fill out the law in 
this area. Celebrating the Bouley litigation's partnership 
between a national advocacy organization and a zealous 
legal services attorney, both Stern and Martin emphasize 
the need for local advocates to think of domestic violence 
victims' housing issues as potential civil rights claims. 
A variety of factors will suggest the best strategy for 
each case. Despite the fact that the disparate impact theory 
emerged first, Stern suggests that disparate treatment claims 
may ultimately prove more acceptable to courts than dis­
parate impact claims, given general skepticism regarding 
the latter. Although both Stern and Martin emphasize that 
large public housing authorities are not necessarily less apt 
to discriminate against domestic violence victims on the 
basis of gender stereotypes, the disparate treatment theory 
may be better suited to cases involving non-institutional 
landlords. Martin notes that intent to discriminate and 
reliance on gender-stereotyped thinking may be easier 
to prove in smaller, less bureaucratic settings, such as in 
preponderance of the evidence that she would have taken the same 
action for nondiscriminatory reasons alone. 
195ee Telephone interviews, supra note 9. 
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cases against private and tenant-based Section 8 landlord 
as well as small public housing authorities. 
The ACLU's Lenora Lapidus has suggested that, in 
addition to Fair Housing Act claims, a domestic violence 
survivor living in public or other assisted housing may be 
able to bring constitutional claims.20 Where seeking police 
assistance or obtaining a protective order has led to evic­
tion, the survivor may be able to claim that public hous­
ing authorities chill and/ or punish her exercise of the First 
Amendment right to petition the government. If inten­
tional sex discrimination can be established, the survivor 
may have an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. And, given that claims under the Equal Pro­
tection Clause require proof of intentional discrimination, 
notes Martin, rather than just disparate impact, a gender 
stereotype argument like the one made in Boulet; may be 
especially helpful for constitutional claims. 
Not only litigation, but also legislative and administra­
tive advocacy, are essential tools for taming what Stem calls 
housing's "wasteland of sex discrimination." Responding 
to litigation and advocacy by a coalition of national civil 
rights, domestic violence and housing groups, the 2003 
edition of HUD's Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook 
included new guidance that encouraged public housing 
authorities to prefer domestic violence victims in admis­
sions and transfers, and to avoid evicting and terminating 
survivors for the actions of their abusers.21 
National legislation to protect the housing rights of 
abuse survivors in public and other federally assisted 
housing is now pending before Congress.22ln addition to 
such efforts at the federal level, advocates are working 
to enact state legislation to prohibit housing discrimina­
tion against all domestic violence victims, not just those 
living in assisted housing. Rhode Island and Washington 
already have such statutes in force.D Wisconsin prohib­
its landlords from determining that someone's tenancy 
should be terminated on the basis that it poses a direct 
threat to others' safety or property on the basis of the ten­
ant's domestic abuse status/4 while Arizona invalidates 
any lease provisions waiving or limiting a tenant's right 
to call for emergency assistance in a domestic violence 
situation.25 In spring 2005, Colorado passed legislation 
that provides a variety of new protections for domestic 
violence survivors (see box for further detail).26 In New 
20See Lapidus, supra note 9, at 383. 
215ee HUD, PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 215-21 (2003) (Chapter 
19: Domestic Violence). 
22See Violence Against Women Act Reautlzorizatiou Includes Sigrziftcant New 
Housing Provisions in this issue of the Housing l.Jzw Bulletin. 
23R.l. GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-2.4 (2005); W AS�I. REv. CoDE§§ 58.18.580, 59.18.352 
(2005). 
"Wis. Stat.§ 106.50(5m)(d) (2004). 
25A.R.S. § 33-1315 (2004). 
26CoLO. HB. 1169 (2005). 
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Mexico, intimate partner violence is recognized as a 
defense in eviction actions as well.27 
Conclusion 
"[W]hether or not someone subject to domestic vio­
lence is considered to be a 'victim' is intimately connected 
to . . .  'good girl /bad girl' stereotypes."28 The decision in 
BouleJj represents a new judicial recognition that such ste­
reotypes can result in violations of core fair housing rights. 
To develop the sex discrimination law in housing to match 
its power in the area of employment, local advocates must 
look to the civil rights dimensions of their work with 
domestic violence survivors facing housing crises. • 
27N.M. Stat. § 47-8-33(1) (2004). 
"'Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Viole11ce in Black a11d Wlrite: Racialized Ge11der 
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 CoLUM. ]. GENDER & L. 1, 22 (1998) (quoted 
m ACLU, Mem.of Law as Amicus Curine in Supp. of Pl. 's Mot. for and 
Opp'n to Summary Judgment at 5). 
New Colorado Law 
Protects Housing Rights of 
Domestic Violence Survivors 
Colorado has previously recognized domestic 
victimization as an eviction defense but a new law 
2005 Colo. HB 1169 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT 
§§ 13-40-104, 13-40-107.5(5), 38-12-402), offers affir­
mative protections to survivors of domestic violence 
and abuse. Legislation signed by Colorado governor 
Bill Owens on April 27 now provides that a domes­
tic violence victim, as documented by police report 
or protective order, cannot be held liable for unlaw­
ful detention of real property as a result of abuse. It 
further establishes that abusive behavior cannot be 
considered a substantial violation of a lease by the 
victim of that abuse, and preserves the landlord's 
right to evict the abuser. Finally, the new law permits 
a victim to break his or her lease on written notice to 
the landlord. 
The new law went into effect on July 1. 
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